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Abstract—The transfer of cybersecurity domain knowledge from security ex-
perts (‘Ethical Hackers’) to software engineers is discussed in terms of desira-
bility and feasibility. Possible mechanisms for the transfer are critically exam-
ined. Software engineering methodologies do not make use of security domain 
knowledge in its form of vulnerability databases (e.g. CWE, CVE, Exploit DB), 
which are therefore not appropriate for this purpose. An approach based upon 
the improved use of pattern languages that encompasses security domain 
knowledge is proposed.  
Keywords: Software development lifecycle (SDLC), Security pattern (SP), 
Software Fault pattern (SFP), Attack pattern (AP), Vulnerability database 
(VDB)  
1 Introduction  
Programmers make mistakes. There are ‘15-50 errors per 1000 lines of delivered 
code’ (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:87). Much research effort has concen-
trated on addressing this problem (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:96). Of 
particular concern are those software flaws that lead to security vulnerabilities.  The 
deliberate misuse of such a vulnerability is termed an exploitation, resulting in infor-
mation leaks, and reduce the value or usefulness of the system (RW.ERROR - Unable 
to find reference:90). Generally, software developers do not understand the security as 
their focus is on delivering features, rather than on ensuring the software security, so 
it is often considered as something to be added to a system as a bolt-on component 
into later stages of development. However, the cost of fixing bugs post software re-
lease is estimated to be 30 times pre-release cost (RW.ERROR - Unable to find refer-
ence:30). Testing has poor relation with security. It is unusual for the software devel-
oper to use testing approaches for finding vulnerabilities; this issue has not received 
the research attention it requires (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:170). One 
implication of this is that security concerns should be embedded into the software 
development lifecycle (including the early phases) (RW.ERROR - Unable to find 
reference:168).  
90% of security incidents result from exploitation of flaws in software (RW.ERROR - 
Unable to find reference:240). In reality, however, software developers struggle 
against recurring and consistent software flaws (i.e. buffer overflows and integer 
overflows), which are exploited daily by malicious hackers. Nonetheless, a large body 
of knowledge about software vulnerabilities exists within the cybersecurity communi-
ty, in particular amongst penetration testers and ethical hackers. The term ‘Ethical 
Hacker’ (EH) will be used as a shorthand to denote this community. Currently ethical 
hackers put much effort into classifying discovered vulnerabilities and developing 
taxonomies of these vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities are then catalogued in public-
ly available vulnerability databases (VDBs) (RW.ERROR - Unable to find refer-
ence:209). Software developers have worked to embed security within the software 
development lifecycle (SDLC) (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:249) in order 
to fix the deployment errors. The mechanism of knowledge transfers between the 
work on vulnerability databases (VDBs), developers’ perceptions of security issues 
and the security development lifecycle (SDLC) is complex, which creates a distinct 
communication gap between ethical hackers and software engineers (RW.ERROR - 
Unable to find reference:197). Interception of (knowledge) communication directs 
software developers to repeat persistent prevalent vulnerabilities and gives rise to 
software flaws exploitation. Various attempts to capture and formalize the transferring 
knowledge in a manner appropriate to software engineers have been made, including 
Misuse Patterns (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:81), Software Fault Patterns 
(SFP) (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:69), and Security Patterns (SP) 
(RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:227). The need for a better understanding of 
this mechanism and our proposed solution is the subject of remainder of this paper, 
which is structured as follows: Section 2 examines previous work in this area and 
leads the following hypotheses:  
Table 1. –Proposed Hypotheses 
H-1 Software developers lack the conscious understanding to identify recurring software flaws 
during software development process due to stagnated and possibly degrading vulnerabilities’ 
knowledge transfer. 
H-2 Patterns (anti-patterns, security patterns and attack patterns) are an appropriate means of com-
municating knowledge of vulnerabilities from ethical hackers to software engineers. However, 
existing applications of these pattern languages fail to do so. 
In section 3, shortcomings of previous attempts are analyzed and in section 4, pro-
posals for a pattern-based approach (Vulnerability Anti-Pattern) to the problems are 
presented. 
2 Background and Related Work  
2.1 Building Security by Software Engineers  
Other researchers had attempted addressing software developers’ security concerns as 
part of the software development process. For example, earlier attempts have been 
conducted based upon improving libraries, implementation languages, and language 
processors (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:116, RW.ERROR - Unable to 
find reference:19). Approaches based on static and dynamic code analysis have been 
proposed by providing different guidelines, such as SDL banned functions 
(RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:188). Software engineers have attempted 
early exclusion of the vulnerabilities by considering security issues at all phases of the 
SDLC. Examples of these approaches are considered in Table 2: (RW.ERROR - Una-
ble to find reference:218, RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:227)  
Table 2.Approachs To Embed Security In Software Development Processes  





SDL is proposed to reduce software maintenance costs and increase reliability of software 
with regards to software security related bugs. Cybersecurity standards, such as ISO 
27001 are incorporated into the SDL to ensure that any software produced with this pro-
cess complies with industry recognized standards. However, compliance with standards 
does not necessarily lead to all vulnerabilities being eliminated from software. The lack-
ing of this model is discussed in section 4.2. 
OWASP 
CLASP  
OWASP Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process includes a set of 
guidelines for web security requirements, cheat sheets, a development guide, a code 
review and a testing guide, tools and information about top web security vulnerabilities. 
This is explored further in section 4.2. 
Security 
Patterns (SP) 
It defines as a solution to stop or mitigate a set of specified threats through certain securi-
ty mechanisms, and designing to assist software developers who are not security experts 
with embedding security in their systems. It can also be a useful tool for teaching security 
concepts (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:174). This is explored further in (4.2). 
However, they are not based directly on the vulnerability knowledge stored in VDBs, 
which is necessary for achieving currency and a timely response to new threats 
(RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:107).  
2.2 Attempts by Ethical Hacker to Catalogue and Use Patterns to 
Communicate Vulnerabilities 
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) comprises CWE, CVE and CAPEC, 
which are the three most comprehensive vulnerability databases (VDBs). They are 
open-source and maintained by MITRE (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:22) 
as shown in Table 3. Table 3.Attempts to Catalogue vulnerabilities  
Name  Description  
CWE The Common Weakness Enumeration database (CWE) catalogues weaknesses that can occur 
in software. These weaknesses are described as software bugs that can lead to vulnerabilities. 
CVE The Common Vulnerabilities Enumeration database (CVE) catalogues specific examples of 
publicly known vulnerabilities that exist in software. 
CAPEC The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification database (CAPEC) provides 
formal attack patterns, while considering the CVE examples and CWE information. 
In addition to the above VDBs, security experts have also endeavored to embed their 
knowledge of vulnerabilities in the form of patterns (as shown in Table-4) such as 
SFP, AP and Misuse pattern. This will be explored further in section 4.4.  
Table 4. Attempts to use patterns to communicate vulnerabilities  
Name Description  




(vulnerabilities) and will be explored further in Section 4.4. However, a lack of detailed 





AP is derived from CAPEC database, which describes a procedure of a particular vulnerabil-
ity attack format. However, it is not intended as a source of design patterns (like standard 
software pattern) Generally, the complicated structure and understanding difficulty restrain 
developers in their usage. There is not much research done on usage of attack pattern by 
software developers due to their inherent complexity. 
Misuse 
Patterns 
It describes the malicious hacker generic prospect while considering sub-dimensions, which 
classifying into set of attack actions and enumerating with possible security patterns as a 
countermeasure (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:80). Although, the misuse pattern 
groundwork clearly evidences the no usage of cybersecurity knowledge sources (i.e. VDBs) 
in defining attack action. Thus far, misuse patterns have certain construction deficiencies and 
lack considerable usage for developers. 
3 Analysis 
3.1 Potential Causes of Poor Knowledge Sharing 
The lack of a shared understanding between the Software Engineering and Ethical 
Hacking communities is well documented (RW.ERROR - Unable to find refer-
ence:153, RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:181). Although there are excep-
tions, security testing typically takes place as an activity during the SDLC. Ethical 
Hackers communicate with and report to system administrators and IT managers. 
Although, there is some crossover between the ground knowledge and skill-set of a 
software engineer and an ethical hacker, they own some very distinct technical do-
mains, with different educational paths, different technical languages and different 
professional bodies. Generally, a malicious hacker does not work under the same 
constraints of project schedules and deadlines as a software engineer does. If they 
wish to spend six months examining in minute detail of the state of stack under a 
particular attack condition, they will not have employers pressurizing employees, to 
deliver. Thus, they have the advantage of time. This coupled with the extensive 
knowledge sharing that takes place amongst the hacking community (RW.ERROR - 
Unable to find reference:180) means that a hacker may be more familiar with the 
weaknesses in a particular piece of software than those who created it.  
3.2 Software Engineering Problems 
The approaches from section 3.1 are attempts by the software engineering community 
to enable the integration of security concerns into the process of developing software. 
The approaches, such as SDL, OWASP CLASP and SP, focus only on fulfilling secu-
rity guidelines and standards rather than raising awareness of vulnerabilities. SDL 
does not embed any knowledge from cybersecurity experts and are challenging for 
those software developers who have limited awareness and understanding of the secu-
rity vulnerabilities in order to apply the security guidelines effectively. The organiza-
tional emphasis of SDL may also be of limited applicability in the informal world of 
cross platform application deployment. OWASP CLASP implementation is limited to 
web-based systems. Furthermore, the value of SPs in order to provide usable and 
understandable documentation for developers is questionable due to their complexity 
(RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:285), and they are generally not adopted by 
developers due to their poorly described implementation (RW.ERROR - Unable to 
find reference:41). This can be attributed to the lack of an accepted standard catalogue 
and a lack of methodological support.  
3.3 Cyber Security Problems 
The various databases described are maintained by cybersecurity professionals to 
keep track of known vulnerabilities in the different versions of released software. It is 
clear that the intended audience for these databases is not software engineers involved 
in developing software but rather systems administrators looking to secure their exist-
ing systems. It might be possible that the information contained therein is simply not 
generalized enough to be directly relevant for software developers to use in the devel-
opment process. Some of the difficulties that software developers face are enumerated 
in Table-5: Table 5. VDBs issues  
No standardi-
zation  
No standard taxonomy/classification scheme for existing VDBs, thus each of them use 
their own approach, none of which were explicitly designed to use during SDLC. As 
such, these VDBs can typically appear complex and ambiguous to the software devel-
oper (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:142, RW.ERROR - Unable to find refer-
ence:150, RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:134). 
Limited 
knowledge  
Closed source VDBs, such as the Carnegie-Mellon US Cert database and Secunia, are 
of necessity limited in the information that they can show concerning code-level errors. 
Complexed 
knowledge  
It is clearly shown by many research studies, which have compared vulnerability in-
formation across the multiple VDBs that these repositories are deficient in providing 
interoperability, knowledge consistency and are not following standard classification 
schemes (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:207, RW.ERROR - Unable to find 
reference:208).  
3.4 Addressing Shortcomings of Previous Pattern-Based Attempts 
Section 3.3 discussed previous attempts to use patterns/pattern languages in the cy-
bersecurity context. These attempts highlighted the following shortcomings: a distinct 
communication gap between software developers and ethical hackers; software devel-
opers lack conscious understanding about prevalent vulnerabilities because of unusa-
ble and complicated knowledge sources, SDLC does not adequately address software 
security practices, and finally there are limited efforts from both the cybersecurity and 
software engineering communities to work together to address software vulnerabili-
ties. It is clear that the use of patterns can only succeed in the context of an appropri-
ate software development process, which must include knowledge from the VDBs. 
The author’s future work will examine the way in which patterns can be used to cap-
ture VBDs knowledge in a usable format, the need to provide understandable vulner-
abilities’ awareness to developers is emphasized by Fahl et.al and Acar et.al work 
(RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:286, RW.ERROR - Unable to find refer-
ence:287) . The desirability of a methodology and tool is also support by McGraw 
(RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:150) and Borstad (RW.ERROR - Unable to 
find reference:196). 
4 Practical Proposition: Our Solution  
To address these issues, our research has led to the creation of a set of ‘Vulnerability 
Anti-Patterns’, based on the OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities. Our anti-patterns have 
been constructed following two main stages: knowledge extraction (1-knowledge 
pulling process sourced from VDBs and security patterns) and knowledge provision 
(2-knowledge pushing process to educate developers through anti-patterns).  
4.1 The Knowledge Extraction (1-Knowledge Pulling Process) 
The knowledge pulling process sourced by cybersecurity community such as VDBs 
(CWE, CVE), security patterns and attack pattern databases (CAPEC), and collected 
essential information of the vulnerability. For example, general information, root-
causes and attack procedures. This is the first step towards addressing the communi-
cation gap. The knowledge pulling process comprises two sub-parts: 1) Creating a 
taxonomy of vulnerabilities. The taxonomy includes vulnerability info, vulnerability 
footprints or characteristics and mitigation categories; 2) generating a decision tree 
which describes the vital VDBs information, and shows safeguard and injury paths 
that map security incidents with their low-level and high-level root-causes of vulnera-
bilities in respective phase of software development life cycle (SDLC).  
4.2 Knowledge Provision (2-Knowledge Pushing Process) 
Extracted knowledge passed to the knowledge pushing process, which captures previ-
ous process formalized information in the form of patterns, known as Vulnerability 
Anti-Patterns that is most appropriate mechanism to communicate knowledge of vul-
nerabilities to software developers.  
4.2.1 The Notion of Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP) 
A recurring error or vulnerability initiates an anti-pattern, which can occur due to any 
poor software design or implementation errors. Same in the case of vulnerabilities, 
which are, commonly reoccurring flaws, so why does not capture and address the 
fundamental problems of cybersecurity through anti-patterns. A VAP describes a 
problem, i.e. poor practice that negatively causes a security flaw, and a solution, i.e. a 
set of refactoring actions that can be carried out to mitigate or stop flaws. In contrast 
to SP, which are only designed to perceive a threat, not to repair a vulnerability, and 
VDBs that appear complicated for developers’ understanding and are generally not 
considered as a part of developers’ security practices. It has been argued 
(RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:172) that the prevalent software errors oc-
curred because of established software practices that actually have negative impact 
during SDLC. Such poor practices generally cause prevalent vulnerabilities. It can 
thus be suggested that these poor practices need to be identified and refactored so safe 
solutions can be generated (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:9). The use of 
anti-patterns for finding and understanding vulnerabilities is understudied, particularly 
for software developers. VAP can describe poor practices or solutions, which aid in 
reasoning about and communicating unsuccessful design intent, and introduce refac-
tored solutions, which suggests safe alternative procedures. The advantage of adopt-
ing VAP during software development process is that it bridges the knowledge gap 
between software developers and security experts about commonly occurring soft-
ware flaws. This finding has important implications for developing security training 
methods. Therefore, an anti-pattern is suggested for the vulnerability that includes 
necessary vulnerability information in a well-defined and usable format for those 
inexperienced and naive developers who do not understand security and can be an 
effective way of communicating vulnerable poor practices, so developers can learn 
valuable lesson from other fellows’ successes and failures. Without this wisdom, anti-
patterns of prevalent vulnerabilities will continue to persist. 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern: A Proposed Solution.  
Authors propose a new refactored solution called ‘Vulnerability Anti-Patterns’ that 
are intended to provide the developers’ security necessary awareness. Since the vul-
nerability anti-patterns’ core objective is to highlight the entire software exploitation 
potential, each pattern has been written to describe the following: general practices of 
the anti-pattern (i.e. how it could be misused), examples such as CVE (real-world 
exploitation) and sample vulnerable code, and finally the footstep of risk patterns 
within SDLC, the refactored solution and related solutions in the form of security 
patterns. Ultimately, the anti-patterns should enable the developers to realize the root-
cause of the vulnerability. In regards to the proposed solutions (or countermeasures to 
the vulnerabilities), we anticipate that the anti-patterns will encourage the developers 
to retain a deep understanding and conscious alertness of vulnerabilities in their future 
development practices. Our template for an anti-pattern is presented below. We have 
utilized this template and produced complete anti-patterns for 10 vulnerabilities to 
date. In addition to the complete pattern data outlined below, we have also produced 
an abridged version of each pattern, which describes, using languages from various 
different programming languages how each vulnerability can be exploited. Vulnera-
bility Anti- Pattern Template. Table 6. 
Pattern Main-Division  Pattern Sub-Division 
1. Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern General info  
 
1.1. Anti-Pattern Name: 
1.2. Also Known as: 
1.3. Most Frequent Scale in SDLC: Requirement Specification, Design, Im-
plementation/Coding-Phase 
1.4. Problem Description: 
1.5. CWE Mapping: CWE-ID, General Name  
1.6. Related CWEs: 




2.1. Refactored Solution Name: 
2.2. Refactored Solution Type: Software Pattern, Technology Pattern, 
Process Pattern, Role Pattern 
2.3. Root Causes (Context): Unbalanced Forces related to meeting require-
ments, controlling technology changes, controlling use and implemen-
tation of people.  
2.4. Risk patterns and Consequences: 
2.5. Typical Causes 
3. Problem Fingerprints  3.1. Software Fault Pattern (SFP) 
4. Known Exploitation  4.1. Attack Pattern (Attack patterns-CAPEC) 
5. Mitigation (Refactors 
the problem) 
5.1. Refactored Solutions: 
5.1.1. Solution Steps SDLC, Description  
5.2. Examples: (Real-world Patch Example) 
5.3. Pen Testing Techniques 
5.4. Related Solutions(SP): 
5.4.1. General Solution (All in one solution) 
5.4.2. Language Solution 
4.3 Evaluation 
To evaluate the effectiveness of ‘Vulnerability Anti-Patterns, we are in the process of 
conducting a series of experiments with software developers from two international 
organizations and computing students from our own university. Stage-1: Pre-
assessment evaluation to measure participants’ actual awareness about poor develop-
ment practices. Stage-2: Participants are trained while using informal versions of the 
vulnerability anti-patterns. Stage-3: Post assessment evaluation to how much partici-
pants able to improve their understanding of vulnerabilities accompanied by the for-
mal version of vulnerability anti-patterns. Stage-4: Comparative analysis performed 
between trained and untrained developers to measure the progression in developers’ 
abilities to identify and understand the most commonly persistent software flaws re-
garding the efficiency of vulnerability anti-patterns.  
5 Conclusion 
Secure software development is one of the most challenging areas of cybersecurity. 
Although, the cybersecurity industry is mature and generates a wealth of resources on 
discovered software vulnerabilities in the form of VDBs, software developers are 
continuing to produce recurring and persistent software flaws at an alarming rate. The 
software engineering community has also worked to embed security into the SDLC; 
however, these independent efforts fail to provide effective solutions against prevalent 
vulnerabilities. Hackers on a daily basis exploit a large number of fatal development 
errors. Software developers are largely unaware of the design and implementation-
level security flaws (poor development practices) which generally turn into fatal secu-
rity weaknesses (vulnerabilities). There exists a big communication gap between the 
software developers and security experts, which does not help them to solve this prob-
lem. The research proposes a methodology to use a pattern for transferring a neces-
sary vulnerabilities knowledge to software developers through ‘Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern’, and considers the use of patterns to communicate knowledge of software 
vulnerabilities in usable format with the best means of avoiding their creation. It 
bridges the communication gap between them with assistance of classified cybersecu-
rity knowledge sources such as VDBs, which ultimately share essential information 
about common errors and help to identify software developers’ secure ideas to build 
secure software. We propose that one solution to this problem lies in the use of pat-
terns languages (with appropriate methodological, tool and training support) to better 
capture and communicate the information currently held in VDBs to create a ‘Safe 
Development Environment’. Therefore, knowledge of vulnerabilities can bridge the 
communication gap between cybersecurity and software engineering communities. It 
is toward this goal that our future work, based upon this initial study will be directed. 
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